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Scientific and Legal Developments in Fire 
and Arson Investigation Expertise in 
Texas v. Willingham 
Rachel Dioso-Villa* 
ABSTRACT 
The forensic sciences, as a form of professional knowledge, 
are changing with new advancements in technology and 
continuing research and development. With the National 
Academy of Science’s recent call for more research and testing of 
the forensic sciences, the criminal justice system is faced with 
the challenges of handling cases where convictions are based on 
outdated or discredited evidence. In light of technological 
advancements in the field, this article examines the evolution of 
fire- and arson-investigation knowledge over the course of a 
highly publicized capital murder case. The history of arson 
investigation is discussed, as is the legal admissibility of such 
expert testimony. Arson investigation expertise stems from non-
scientific or experience-based origins, yet is conveyed in court as 
scientific fact. The article identifies the dangers of admitting 
such testimony into court without scrutiny. The lack of scientific 
validation of investigative methods, overreaching scientific 
claims based on case facts and witness statements, and fire 
investigators’ susceptibility to contextual bias are discussed. The 
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article raises questions as to whether and how the legal system 
has propagated the misuse of arson investigation testimony and 
how outdated understandings of evidence may impact the 
identification of future miscarriages of justice. 
 
I. Introduction ........................................................................... 818 
II. Fire and Arson Investigation—Experience-Based 
Expertise ......................................................................... 820 
A. Fire and Arson Investigation ..................................... 820 
B. Arson Indicators ......................................................... 823 
III. Admitting Fire and Arson Evidence as Expert 
Testimony ........................................................................ 825 
IV. Fire and Arson Expert Testimony ...................................... 829 
A. Texas v. Willingham—Case Study ............................ 829 
B. Experience-Based Expert Testimony ........................ 829 
V. Investigative Facts and Scientific Analysis ........................ 833 
A. Extra-Legal Factors ................................................... 833 
B. Contextual Bias .......................................................... 835 
C. Overreaching Claims ................................................. 836 
VI. Post-Conviction Inefficiencies to Detect and Correct 
Errors .............................................................................. 838 
A. Failed Appeals, Habeas Corpus, Petition, and 
Clemency Petition .................................................... 838 
B. Forensic Science Commission Investigation ............. 840 
VII. Fire and Arson Investigation Community ....................... 841 
VIII. Future of Fire and Arson Expertise ................................ 844 
IX. Conclusion ........................................................................... 846 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2009, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) 
published a landmark report, Strengthening Forensic Sciences 
in the United States: A Path Forward, which highlighted the 
inadequacies of the forensic sciences and the dangers of its 
current use in court.1 In it, they noted that with the exception 
of DNA testing, all other forensic disciplines, such as 
fingerprints, firearm identification, and hair evidence, lack 
scientific foundation to interpret and validate their methods 
                                                          
 1. COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIENCE CMTY., 
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE 
UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 5 (2009) [hereinafter A PATH FORWARD]. 
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and claims.2 They recommended that the field conduct more 
rigorous research and systematic scientific testing in which to 
ground their findings and to develop new methods of reliable 
and valid forensic investigation.3 This was not a new 
development. Prior to the NAS report, academic scholars had 
pointed out deficiencies in validation and scientific testing in 
such forensic disciplines as fingerprint identification,4 
handwriting,5 toolmarks,6 and bullet lead analysis,7 to name a 
few. 
Arson investigation expertise is another field that has 
received little attention by social scientists and legal scholars, 
although it is awarded considerable leeway in court when 
investigators testify as expert witnesses.8 Fire experts 
determine the cause and origin of fires, whether the fire was 
intentionally set or accidental, and they provide probative 
evidence in many criminal and civil cases.9 In light of research 
that has called into question the scientific validity of arson 
investigative methods and claims,10 this profession is now 
confronted with new challenges to its admission as expert 
evidence, and the criminal justice system may potentially face 
new claims of innocence in cases that employed outdated 
techniques. 
This article provides a critical evaluation of arson 
investigation knowledge by examining the history and 
                                                          
 2. Id. at 7 (“With the exception of nuclear DNA analysis, however, no 
forensic method has been rigorously shown to have the capacity to 
consistently, and with a high degree of certainty, demonstrate a connection 
between evidence and a specific individual or source.”). 
 3. Id. at 8 (explaining that further research is needed to “establish the 
limits and measures of performance” of forensic methods). 
 4. See SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF 
FINGERPRINTING AND  CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION 259–60 (2001); Jennifer 
Mnookin, The Validity of Latent Fingerprint Identification: Confessions of a 
Fingerprinting Moderate, 7 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 127, 128–30 (2008). 
 5. See D. Michael Risinger, Defining the “Task at Hand”: Non-Science 
Forensic Science After Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
767, 770 n.13 (2000) [hereinafter Risinger, Defining]. 
 6. See Adina Schwartz, A Systematic Challenge to the Reliability and 
Admissibility of Firearms and Toolmark Identification, 6 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. 
L. REV. 1, 7–12 (2005). 
 7. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FORENSIC ANALYSIS: WEIGHING 
BULLET LEAD EVIDENCE 9–10 (2004). 
 8. See infra Part III. 
 9. See A PATH FORWARD, supra note 1, at 86 (“Forensic science experts 
and evidence are routinely used in the service of the criminal justice system.”). 
 10. See infra Part II. 
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transition of the profession from its non-scientific origins to its 
presentation as a scientifically-informed subject-matter 
expertise in court. I will examine the expert testimony of arson 
experts over the course of the Texas capital murder trial of 
Cameron Todd Willingham. The article highlights how 
testimony by fire investigators in this case contributed to the 
potential wrongful conviction of the defendant and 
demonstrates how legal and scientific changes in the field 
exposed the contentious nature of arson evidence as presented 
at trial. I will analyze the key forensic evidence that 
contributed to the defendant’s conviction and expose limitations 
in the conduction of fire investigations and its presentation as 
scientific testimony. The article concludes by questioning the 
adequacy of post-conviction relief to detect and remedy such 
limitations on appeal or through habeas corpus and clemency 
petitions, as well as the effectiveness of post-execution 
investigations, such as those conducted by forensic science 
commissions, that have the capacity to acknowledge and 
address the use of discredited evidence within the forensic 
community. 
II. FIRE AND ARSON INVESTIGATION—EXPERIENCE-
BASED EXPERTISE 
A. FIRE AND ARSON INVESTIGATION 
A fire can consume combustible evidence due to its highly 
destructive nature, leaving fire investigators with the 
challenging task of determining its cause and origin based on 
the remaining debris.11 Fire investigators may start their 
investigations upon arrival on site, or they may receive reports 
from the fire department several days after the fire has been 
extinguished to begin their investigations.12 They may draw 
their conclusions based on several factors, including the 
analysis of debris through physical evidence, chemical testing, 
                                                          
 11. Stephen M. Olenick et al., The Behavior of Liquid Fuel on Carpet 
(Porous Media): A Case for the Inclusion of Science in Fire Investigation, 46 
FIRE TECH. 843, 843 (2010). 
 12. See NAT’L FIRE PROT. ASS’N ET AL., FIRE INVESTIGATOR: PRINCIPLES 
AND PRACTICE TO NFPA 921 AND 1033, at 138–39, 186–94 (3d ed. 2012) 
[hereinafter NFPA 921] (explaining the legal authority required to conduct a 
fire scene investigation and explaining the planning and preplanning process 
of fire scene investigations). 
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third-party reports and photographs, reports from medical 
professionals who treat victim injuries, and interviews with 
eyewitnesses and victims.13 Unlike other forensic sciences that 
attempt to match crime scene evidence with a unique source, 
such as fingerprints or DNA evidence, fire investigators 
interpret evidence and make conclusions as to whether the fire 
was accidental or intentionally set.14 
The fields of fire investigation and fire protection 
engineering developed on parallel tracks that published 
separate texts, manuals, and guides for practitioners.15 On the 
one hand, fire protection engineers attempt to understand the 
physical processes of fire and how to control its growth and 
spread in different environments using different substances.16 
This body of knowledge is continually evolving, due to the need 
to consider the effects of new materials, structures, and fuels 
and its reliance on mathematical equations, computer 
modeling, and the analysis of empirical data allow for the 
accommodation of new findings.17 
On the other hand, fire fighters and police officers, whose 
primary objective was to determine whether the cause of a fire 
was accidental or incendiary, developed arson investigation. 
Fire investigators did not necessarily have scientific training, 
                                                          
 13. See JOHN LENTINI, SCIENTIFIC PROTOCOLS FOR FIRE INVESTIGATION,  
229–95 (2d ed. 2006) (detailing how forensic fire investigators evaluate sources 
of fire ignition). For additional overview of fire and arson investigation 
techniques and methods, see generally JOHN D. DEHAAN & DAVID J. ICOVE, 
KIRK’S FIRE INVESTIGATION (Pearson, 7th ed. 2012). 
 14. LENTINI, supra note 13, at xv (“Unlike . . . almost any other incident 
that requires investigation, a fire is unique in that the first major task, and 
often the most daunting one, is to determine whether a crime has been 
committed.”). 
 15. Id. at 10–13 (explaining the evolution of modern fire science). 
 16. See Pat O’Malley & Steven Hutchinson, Genealogy of “Fire 
Prevention,” in GOVERNANCE AND REGULATION IN SOCIAL LIFE: ESSAYS IN 
HONOUR OF W.G. CARSON 145, 154 (Augustine Brannigan & George Pavlich 
eds., 2007) (“Laboratories were largely staffed by engineers and focused on the 
investigation of specific fires, the testing of new equipment and the 
development of a generalizable knowledge of fire risks.”); see also Milosh T. 
Puchovsky, Structural Fire Protection, in 2 FIRE PROTECTION HANDBOOK, at 
19-1, 19-3 to 19-126 (Arthur E. Cote et al. eds., 20th ed. 2008) (discussing 
building practices). 
 17. Thomas R. May, Fire Pattern Analysis, Junk Science, Old Wives Tales, 
and Ipse Dixit: Emerging Forensic 3D Imaging Technologies to the Rescue?, 16 
RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 1–2 (2010). For further discussion of fire science, see 
generally DOUGAL DRYSDALE, AN INTRODUCTION TO FIRE DYNAMICS (2d ed. 
1998) and O’Malley & Hutchinson, supra note 16, at 154–55. 
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nor was it necessary for them to hold a higher educational 
degree beyond a high school diploma.18 As a result, theories and 
heuristics about the ways in which fires behave developed out 
of the collective experience of fire investigators within the 
community through their field investigations.19 Mentors passed 
down this experiential knowledge to their apprentices without 
experimental or scientific testing to validate their claims.20 For 
example, fire investigators relied on various assumptions such 
as the belief that naturally set or accidental fires had one cause 
and origin; therefore, fires with multiple origins would be 
indicative of arson, and accelerant-induced fires burned faster 
and at higher temperatures than naturally burning fires.21 
Texts and guidelines authored by leading fire investigators 
perpetuated these beliefs and furthered their widespread use.22 
There is considerable variability in procedures and 
training between state, region, county, police and fire 
departments, and among fire investigators themselves.23 
Moreover, there is no consistent standard across courts or 
jurisdictions that require that fire experts be certified 
investigators. Attempts to standardize field practices remain 
controversial among fire investigators, since the field’s 
knowledge base and tenets were born out of individual and 
anecdotal experience about fires and how to conduct 
                                                          
 18. See LENTINI, supra note 13, at xv; David L. Faigman et al., The Legal 
Response to Expert Testimony on Fires and Explosions, in SCIENCE IN THE 
LAW: FORENSIC SCIENCE ISSUES 339, 344 (David L. Faigman et al. eds., 2002). 
 19. See John J. Lentini, The Scientific Basis of Expert Testimony on Fires, 
Arsons, and Explosions, in SCIENCE IN THE LAW: FORENSIC SCIENCE ISSUES, 
supra note 18, at 355, 380–81. 
 20. See LENTINI, supra note 13, at 11–12; see also Michael J. Saks & 
David L. Faigman, Failed Forensics: How Forensic Science Lost Its Way and 
How It Might Yet Find It, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 149, 157–58 (2008); Marc 
Price Wolf, Habeas Relief From Bad Science: Does Federal Habeas Corpus 
Provide Relief for Prisoners Possibly Convicted on Misunderstood Fire Science, 
10 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 213, 217 (2009). 
 21. See JOHN F. BOUDREAU ET AL., ARSON AND ARSON INVESTIGATION: 
SURVEY AND ASSESSMENT 35, 60 (1977); LENTINI, supra note 13 at 513; 
DEHAAN & ICOVE, supra note 13, at 678. 
 22. See, e.g., DEHAAN & ICOVE, supra note 13, at 678; U.S. DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE, FIRE INVESTIGATION HANDBOOK 6 (Francis L. Brannigan et al. 
eds. 1980); Wolf, supra note 20, at 220–25. 
 23.  See generally FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY & U.S. FIRE ADMIN., 
FIRE/ARSON INVESTIGATION TRAINING RESOURCE CATALOG 145–60 (1993) 
(describing the different accreditation requirements for different fire 
investigation programs). 
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investigations.24 This is perpetuated by the fact that there are 
no formal training or specialized courses required to conduct 
fire investigations; rather, investigators should “remain current 
with investigation methodology, fire protection technology, and 
code requirements by attending workshops and seminars, 
and/or through professional publications and journals.”25 The 
NAS highlighted the absence of such a standard in their report 
and recommended that all forensic disciplines standardize 
training requirements for their examiners.26 
B. ARSON INDICATORS 
The use of arson indicators in fire investigation was left 
largely undisputed until the 1980s when technological 
advancements improved the measurement of heat transfer and 
the chemical properties of fires through the use of computer 
modeling and advances in the study of fluid dynamics.27 The 
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), one of the leading 
associations for fire investigators in the United States, 
conducted controlled test fires to evaluate basic assumptions 
and heuristics about incendiary fires.28 Their results challenged 
existing theories of fire behavior that texts and training 
materials had endorsed over the years. For example, it was 
previously believed that fires that burned abnormally fast due 
to the aid of accelerants experienced a moment of “flashover,” 
where all materials in an enclosed room simultaneously 
combusted.29 Controlled test burns later revealed that 
accidental fires set in small, enclosed spaces produced the same 
artifacts of “flashover” and therefore could not solely be 
interpreted as evidence of arson.30 In 1991, fire investigators 
treated the Oakland California firestorm that destroyed 
thousands of houses and hundreds of apartments as a natural 
                                                          
 24. See infra Section VII. 
 25. NFPA 921, supra note 12, at 415. The National Fire Protection 
Association (NFPA) is one of the leading associations for arson investigators in 
the United States. About NFPA, NFPA, http://www.nfpa.org/categoryList.asp? 
categoryID=143 (last visited Apr. 22, 2013). 
 26. See Chapter 5, specifically the section about the “Analysis of 
Explosives Evidence and Fire Debris.” A PATH FORWARD, supra note 1, at 5–
34. 
 27. See LENTINI, supra note 13, at 110–113. 
 28. See NFPA 921, supra note 12, at 44. 
 29.  LENTINI, supra note 13, at 501–03. 
 30. See NFPA 921, supra note 12, at 37 (describing the factors that lead to 
flashover); see also Wolf, supra note 20, at 223. 
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field experiment, since the fires had a known natural cause.31 
The investigators’ conclusions, after sifting through the debris 
of the destroyed homes, again, challenged the validity of many 
of the widely accepted beliefs of arson taught at the time, since 
they found the same burn patterns in these homes.32 
Despite these new findings, fire investigation texts were 
slow to reflect these changes and fire investigators did not 
systematically or immediately alter or update their 
investigative techniques.33 Fire Investigator: Principles and 
Practice to NFPA 921 and 1033 (NFPA 921) explicitly outlined 
that arson indicators should not be solely relied upon to 
determine whether or not the fire was incendiary.34 The guide 
did not explicitly invalidate the use of arson indicators; rather, 
it stated that fire investigators could no longer rely on these 
indicators exclusively in determining arson since they were 
indistinguishable in natural and incendiary fires. Newer 
editions of fire investigation texts soon followed suit and 
referred to these indicators as “myths” or “misconceptions,” 
implying that the current fire investigation community should, 
at the very least, exercise caution when making determinations 
of arson based on such indicators.35 
With these developments in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, it is debatable as to whether the fire community readily 
adopted such advancements. In 2009, NAS stated that the 
forensic sciences, in general, needed standardized reporting of 
their findings and testimony; fire and arson investigation was 
no exception to its recommendations. NAS stated: 
By contrast [to the analysis of explosives], much more research is 
needed on the natural variability of burn patterns and damage 
characteristics and how they are affected by the presence of various 
accelerants. Despite the paucity of research, some arson investigators 
continue to make determinations about whether or not a particular 
fire was set. However, according to testimony presented to the 
                                                          
 31. See John Lentini et al., Unconventional Wisdom: The Lessons of 
Oakland, FIRE & ARSON INVESTIGATOR, June 1993, at 18, 18. 
 32. For example, the theory that fires started by accelerants burn hotter 
than those accidentally set meant that finding melted copper and steel would 
be evidence of arson, since these metals had high melting points. However, fire 
investigators found melted copper and steel in the Oakland houses, despite the 
fact that the fires were not the result of arson. Id. at 19. 
 33. See A PATH FORWARD, supra note 1, at 127. 
 34. See NFPA 921, supra note 12, at 298, 302. 
 35. See DEHAAN & ICOVE, supra note 13, at 687–91; see also LENTINI, 
supra note 13, at 473–74.   
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committee [by John Lentini, Scientific Fire Analysis, L.L.C.], many of 
the rules of thumb that are typically assumed to indicate that an 
accelerant was used (e.g., “alligatoring” of wood, specific char 
patterns) have been shown not to be true. Experiments should be 
designed to put arson investigations on a more solid scientific 
footing.36 
In its evaluation of the existing fire and arson investigation 
techniques, NAS specifically referred to arson indicators as 
“rules of thumb” and acknowledged that there is contradictory 
evidence to challenge its validity. They recommended 
validation studies with experimental designs to test the burn 
patterns in different conditions in an attempt to put the field on 
“more solid scientific footing.” Arson indicators do not 
conclusively prove that an accelerant was used or that the fire 
was incendiary, and the determination that a fire is arson 
based solely on these indicators would arguably be misleading 
to a jury and potentially erroneous. 
III. ADMITTING FIRE AND ARSON EVIDENCE AS  
EXPERT TESTIMONY 
The admission of fire expertise in U.S. courts is not 
necessarily guaranteed, nor does the process result in a 
consistent or predictable outcome. The courts initially resisted 
admitting fire testimony, since they believed that expertise lay 
within the scope of common experience and that it invaded the 
jury’s decision-making process.37 In the 1960s, fire 
investigators were admitted to testify in court as expert 
witnesses with admissibility decisions tending to rest on the 
investigators’ qualifications and experience, rather than the 
reliability or validity of the knowledge, methods, or expertise 
on which investigators based their conclusions.38 
In 1993, the case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. changed the landscape of legal 
                                                          
 36. A PATH FORWARD, supra note 1, at 173 (footnotes omitted). 
Alligatoring is the blistering of wood that produces a pattern that indicates 
that there was a “rapidly developing fire. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra 
note 22, at 6. For elaboration on how specific char patterns refers to the depth 
of burning in the wood to determine the length of time the wood burned see 
LENTINI, supra note 13, at 474–78. 
 37. E.g., State v. Watson, 65 Me. 74, 76–77 (1876); Neal v. Mo. Pac. Ry. 
Co., 153 N.W. 492, 493 (Neb. 1915); New York v. Grutz, 105 N.E. 843, 846–47 
(N.Y. 1914); cf. Sawyer v. State, 132 So. 188, 193–94 (F1a. 1931). 
 38. Faigman et al., supra note 18, at 341–43. 
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admissibility of expert evidence in the United States.39 The 
U.S. Supreme Court made trial judges “gatekeepers” to 
determine the relevancy of the expert evidence and provided 
them with guidelines to evaluate the reliability of the scientific 
theory and techniques.40 To assist in evaluating the reliability 
of the evidence, the Daubert guidelines required that the 
evidence or methods are accepted by the scientific community 
to which it belongs, the science in question has peer-reviewed 
publications, a known low error rate, and a falsifiable and 
testable methodology.41 By specifying factors to evaluate the 
reliability of a particular science, Daubert was perceived as a 
more demanding standard than the previous admission 
standard of Frye v. United States42 that called for the scientific 
community to accept an expert’s methods and techniques.43 
Consistent with its historical roots as a skill-based 
expertise, fire and arson investigation experts attempted to 
evade scrutiny under the new Daubert standards, by claiming 
that their knowledge was not scientific. In the case of Michigan 
Millers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Benfield, the trial court judge 
excluded the insurance company’s arson expert’s testimony on 
the basis that it did not meet Daubert’s reliability criteria.44 
Michigan Millers argued for the application of a lesser 
standard for experience-based expertise. In support of this 
position, the International Association of Arson Investigators 
(IAAI) put forth an amicus curiae brief arguing that arson 
investigation was an experience-based expertise and was not a 
novel or scientific technique—therefore, Daubert should not 
                                                          
 39. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993). 
 40. Id. at 592–93. 
 41. Id. at 593–94. 
 42. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 43. See Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 445, 455 (2000) (“Since 
Daubert, . . . parties relying on expert evidence have had notice of the exacting 
standards of reliability such evidence must meet.”); see also Gary Edmond & 
David Mercer, Experts and Expertise in Legal and Regulatory Settings, in 
EXPERTISE IN REGULATION AND LAW 1, 20–21 (Gary Edmond ed., 2004); Adina 
Schwartz, A “Dogma of Empiricism” Revisited: Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and the Need to Resurrect the Philosophical Insight of 
Frye v. United States, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 149, 154 (1997); Margaret A. 
Berger, What Has a Decade of Daubert Wrought?, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S59, 
S60 (2005). 
 44. Mich. Millers Mut. Ins. Corp. v. Benfield, 140 F.3d 915, 920 (11th Cir. 
1998). 
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apply.45 The appellate court in Michigan Millers upheld the 
trial court ruling that fire investigation expertise should be 
subject to scrutiny under the Daubert standards. Similar 
concerns were raised before the U.S. Supreme Court in Kumho 
Tire Co. v. Carmichael objecting to such investigative work’s 
scientific classification;46 however, the U.S. Supreme Court 
disregarded the IAAI’s assertion and ruled that all scientific 
and skill- or experience-based expert evidence must be 
evaluated by the same admissibility criteria, thereby closing 
any further avenues that might be used to evade Daubert.47 In 
addition, the Supreme Court’s new ruling excused trial judges 
from the onus of differentiating between scientific and 
nonscientific evidence.48 
In the fallout of Daubert and Kumho, gradual pressure 
changed the field of forensic science to elucidate scientifically 
rigorous criteria through the creation of scientific and technical 
working groups within the different forensic disciplines.49 This 
proved challenging for those forensic sciences whose 
foundations were built on the experience and skill of their 
analysts and practitioners.50 Socio-legal scholars currently 
claim that many of the forensic sciences that are routinely 
admitted into court today are admitted without adequate 
supporting evidence to meet the Daubert standards;51 this 
includes handwriting,52 toolmarks,53 and fingerprints.54 As 
                                                          
 45. Brief for International Ass’n of Arson Investigators as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Appellants at 13–14 , Mich. Millers Mut. Ins. Corp. v. Benfield, 
140 F.3d 915 (1998) (No. 97-2138). 
 46. Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 146 (1999). The IAAI filed a 
brief on behalf of Carmichael. Id. at 140. 
 47. Id. at 147, 151. 
 48. See id. at 147. 
 49. See A PATH FORWARD, supra note 1, at 39–53, 85–110. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See Jennifer L. Groscup et al., The Effects of Daubert on the 
Admissibility of Expert Testimony in State and Federal Criminal Cases, 8 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 339, 363 (2002) (“The more interesting finding is 
the striking absence of any significant relationships between the four Daubert 
criteria and decisions to admit or exclude expert evidence.”). 
 52. E.g., D. Michael Risinger, Handwriting Identification, in SCIENCE IN 
THE LAW: FORENSIC SCIENCE ISSUES, supra note 18, at 113, 121–39 
[hereinafter Risinger, Handwriting]; see also Risinger, Defining, supra note 5, 
at 780–81 (noting a court’s rejection of handwriting identification as science 
within the meaning of Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.).  
 53. See Schwartz, supra note 6, at 31–32 (discussing reliability of 
toolmark identification). 
 54. See Simon A. Cole, More than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent 
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such, many of the forensic sciences, including fire investigation, 
can be described as a subjective process that is often based on 
an examiner’s judgment and experience.55 There is a lack of a 
scientific foundation for many of the methods used in fire 
investigation and a lack of data and empirical evidence to 
which fire investigators can refer due to the field’s reliance on 
practical knowledge.56 Despite this, in response to Daubert, 
Kumho and the NAS report, fire investigators have expressed 
the need for the field to move toward the scientific validation of 
its methods and claims.57 
                                                          
Fingerprint Identification, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985, 986–88 (2005) 
(discussing possible errors with fingerprint evidence and the Daubert 
standard); Simon A. Cole, Grandfathering Evidence: Fingerprint Admissibility 
Rulings from Jennings to Llera Plaza and Back Again, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1189, 1197–1200 (2004); Mnookin, supra note 4, at 128–29; see also Itiel E. 
Dror & David Charlton, Why Experts Make Errors, 56 J. FORENSIC 
IDENTIFICATION 600, 600–04 (2006) (categorizing types of error). Many of 
these techniques and methodologies do not stem from the traditional hard 
sciences. As Professor Michael Saks notes, forensic identification sciences 
attempt to accomplish something that no other scientific field attempts to do—
establish links between crime scene evidence to known exemplars. See Michael 
J. Saks, Banishing Ipse Dixit: The Impact of Kumho Tire on Forensic 
Identification Science, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 879, 882 (2000). For example, 
in handwriting identification, document examiners attempt to determine who 
the author of a given written specimen is by comparing it to a known sample. 
It involves the visual scrutiny of written text based on the expert’s experience. 
Document examiners face specific problems in making such determinations, 
such as whether individuals write uniquely from others and whether there is 
variation in any given individual’s writing. See Risinger, Handwriting, supra 
note 52, at 121–22 (noting that specialization is often overlooked by the 
courts); see also Margaret A. Berger, Expert Testimony in Criminal 
Proceedings: Questions Daubert Does Not Answer, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 
1125, 1137–38 (2003); Mark P. Denbeaux & D. Michael Risinger, Kumho Tire 
and Expert Reliability: How the Question You Ask Gives the Answer You Get, 
34 SETON HALL L. REV. 15, 60 (2003); D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert 
Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 
ALB. L. REV. 99, 141 (2000) (comparing handwriting to bite mark analysis). 
 55. David L. Faigman, Anecdotal Forensics, Phrenology, and Other Abject 
Lessons from the History of Science, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 979 (2008) 
(“Indeed, the forensic identification sciences that have little or no research 
basis . . . depend largely on the subjective judgment of practitioners . . . .”); see 
also Saks & Faigman, supra note 20, at 156. 
 56. See Daniel Madrzykowski, State-of-the-Art Research is the Future of 
Fire Investigation, SIU AWARENESS, Mar. 2001, at 18, 19; see also FIRE PROT. 
RESEARCH FOUND., RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE RESEARCH ADVISORY COUNCIL 
ON POST-FIRE ANALYSIS 5–6 (2002) (“Improved methodologies for origin and 
cause determination would also provide greater confidence, and possibly 
greater quality, in statistics on fire problems.”). 
 57. LENTINI, supra note 13, at 13–15; Vincent Brannigan & Jose Torero, 
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IV. FIRE AND ARSON EXPERT TESTIMONY 
A. TEXAS V. WILLINGHAM—CASE STUDY 
In 1992, Cameron Todd Willingham was convicted for 
setting fire to his home and killing his three children. Twelve 
years later, the State of Texas executed him by lethal injection. 
The state’s key evidence came from two fire investigators who 
testified that the fire was intentionally set. The indicators of 
arson included a sample taken from the front porch floorboard 
that tested positive for petroleum-based chemicals; burn 
patterns on the floor in the home where a liquid accelerant was 
believed to have been poured and ignited; broken glass 
patterns; and melted aluminum believed to be caused by 
abnormally high temperatures associated with fires fueled by 
accelerants.58 The fire experts’ investigative techniques and 
their reliance on the interpretation of arson indicators and 
burn patterns were not based on scientific testing, but on 
heuristics consistent with practices employed in the 1980s and, 
in some cases, still relied upon today.59 
B. EXPERIENCE-BASED EXPERT TESTIMONY 
Since Willingham’s execution in 2004, scholars, politicians, 
the media, and social justice organizations have expressed 
interest in the case in light of research in fire investigation 
uncovered before his execution.60 Although there is no way to 
                                                          
The Expert’s New Clothes: Arson “Science” After Kumho Tire, FIRE CHIEF (July 
1, 1999), http://firechief.com/mag/firefighting_experts_new_clothes;   
Madrzykowski, supra note 56, at 19. 
 58. See ARSON REVIEW COMM., REPORT ON THE PEER REVIEW OF THE 
EXPERT TESTIMONY IN THE CASES OF STATE OF TEXAS V. CAMERON TODD 
WILLINGHAM AND STATE OF TEXAS V. ERNEST RAY WILLIS 10–13 (2006), 
available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/ArsonReviewReport.pdf 
(discussing the methodology of investigative techniques used in Willingham); 
see also CRAIG L. BEYLER, ANALYSIS OF THE FIRE INVESTIGATION METHODS 
AND PROCEDURES USED IN THE CRIMINAL ARSON CASES AGAINST ERNEST RAY 
WILLIS AND CAMERON TODD WILLINGHAM 41–42 (2009). 
 59. A PATH FORWARD, supra note 1, at 170–73; May, supra note 17, at    
2–3. 
 60. See Steve Mills & Maurice Possley, Man Executed on Disproved 
Forensics: Fire That Killed His 3 Children Could Have Been Accidental, CHI. 
TRIB., (Dec. 9, 2004), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-
0412090169dec09,0,7443588,full.story; Paul C. Giannelli, The Execution of 
Cameron Todd Willingham: Junk Science, an Innocent Man, and the Politics of 
Death 2 (Case W. Reserve Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 2011-18, 
2011); see also Craig M. Cooley & Gabriel S. Oberfield, Increasing Forensic 
Evidence’s Reliability and Minimizing Wrongful Convictions: Applying 
DIOSO-VILLA_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 7/12/2013  12:01 PM 
830 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 14:2 
 
 
definitively prove Willingham’s innocence, since intention 
cannot be deduced without having been present at the start of 
the fire, new research calls into question the evidence that 
convicted him.61 If Willingham’s innocence were demonstrated, 
this would mark the first occasion in which a U.S. government 
body acknowledges that they executed an innocent person.62 
In Texas v. Willingham, the Assistant Fire Chief of 
Corsicana, Douglas Fogg, and Deputy Fire Marshal from the 
State Fire Marshal’s Office (SFMO), Manuel Vasquez, 
investigated the fire scene and declared it an arson.63 In his 
investigation, Fogg employed a common investigative technique 
of drawing a determination of arson by eliminating accidental 
or natural causes of the fire (i.e., electrical shorts and gas 
leaks) and noted unusual burn characteristics, such as puddle 
configurations and pour patterns.64 Similarly, Vasquez 
identified over twenty indicators of arson that have, since the 
trial, been highly disputed and subsequently found as not 
necessarily indicative of arson.65 At trial, he testified: 
The fire is telling me this. The fire tells a story. I am just the 
interpreter. I am looking at the fire, and I am interpreting the fire. 
That is what I know. That is what I do best. And the fire does not lie. 
It tells me the truth.66 
Fogg and Vasquez’s expert testimonies conclusively determined 
that the fire was incendiary and that Willingham had set fire to 
his home with the intention to kill his children.67 The jury 
found Willingham guilty of three counts of capital murder and 
sentenced him to death.68 
 
                                                          
Daubert Isn’t the Only Problem, 43 TULSA L. REV. 285, 331–32 (2008) 
(describing briefly the effects and commission that arose out of Willingham’s 
case). 
 61. Report of Dr. Gerald Hurst at 3–6, Ex parte Willingham, No. 
24,4679(B) (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 13, 2004). 
 62. David Grann, Trial By Fire: Did Texas Execute an Innocent Man?, 
NEW YORKER (Sept. 7, 2009), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/09/07/ 
090907fa_fact_grann?printable=true&currentPage=all. 
 63. Statement of Facts Volume XI at 224–58, Texas v. Willingham, No. 
24-467 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Aug. 18, 1992). 
 64. Id. at 256–57. 
 65. Report of Dr. Gerald Hurst, supra note 61, at 3–6; see also BEYLER, 
supra note 58, at 47–50 (describing faults in Vasquez’s testimony).  
 66. Statement of Facts Volume XI, supra note 63, at 244. 
 67. Id. at 168, 258. 
 68. See Giannelli, supra note 60, at 2. 
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In Vasquez’s explanation to the jury of his assertion of 
arson, there is little science involved: 
Heat rises. In the winter time when you are going to the bathroom 
and if you don’t have any carpet on the rug and you are barefooted, 
and you step on that cold floor, that floor is colder than the ceiling. It 
always is. Like right now, this floor is colder than this ceiling here. 
 So when I found that the floor is hotter than the ceiling, that’s 
backwards, upside down. It shouldn’t be like that. The only reason 
that the floor is hotter is because there was an accelerant. That’s the 
difference. Man made it hotter or woman or whatever. Human 
being[s] made it hotter.69 
Vasquez explained fire investigation and fire dynamics as 
logical and common sense, such that jurors themselves could 
evaluate with their senses and experiences to arrive at the 
same conclusions. Similarly, Vasquez testified that burn 
patterns on the floor indicated the pouring of an accelerant and 
igniting it: 
Burn trailers [are] like a trailer, you know, like a little path, a burnt 
path. A pour pattern, which is a pattern like somebody put some 
liquid on the floor . . . then it creates a puddle. Liquid creates puddles. 
When it rains, you get puddles. When the baby drops it’s [sic] milk, 
you create puddles. If you ever drop a coke, you create puddles. All 
this area has that, has the burn trailer pour patterns and 
configurations.70 
Again, Vasquez explained fire dynamics as predictable and 
logical outcomes that jurors could imagine and evaluate for 
themselves. In this way, jurors need not solely rely on the 
expert opinions that the fire was intentionally set, but they 
could evaluate the evidence to draw their own opinions of the 
fire. In this account, Vasquez’ explanation lacked any scientific 
basis for his conclusions and did not allude to scientific testing. 
He reported melted aluminum on the porch, which the fire 
investigation community at the time believed could only occur 
at high temperatures that could not be reached without the use 
of an accelerant. He testified, 
And aluminum melts at 1200 degrees normal. Wood fire does not 
exceed 800 degrees. So to me, when aluminum melts, it shows me 
that it has had a lot of intense heat . . . . Therefore, the only thing 
that can cause that to react is an accelerant. You know, it makes the 
fire hotter. It’s not [a] normal fire.71 
Here, he separated normal fires from abnormal fires, which he 
implied are incendiary fires that use accelerants. He offered no 
                                                          
 69. Statement of Facts Volume XI, supra note 63, at 256. 
 70. Id. at 238. 
 71. Id. at 249. 
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alternative explanation as to why the aluminum melted or why 
or how the fire may have reached high temperatures. 
As further evidence of arson, Vasquez testified that the 
fires started in the bedroom hallway and front porch, 
concluding that “[m]ultiple areas of origin indicate—especially 
if there is no connecting path, that they were intentionally set 
by human hands.”72 In order to draw such a conclusion, 
Vasquez would need to clearly demonstrate that the fires were 
isolated and had no connecting paths, which he did not explain 
to the jury and which other fire experts contested in post-
conviction analyses of the evidence.73 
Fogg and Vasquez chemically analyzed over a dozen 
samples taken from “suspicious” areas of the house that showed 
severe burning and where the fire investigators hypothesized 
were the origins of the fires using gas chromatography with 
mass spectrometry (GC-MS).74 All samples, with the exception 
of the front porch taken from the barbecue area, tested 
negative for any traces of an accelerant. Vasquez explained the 
chemical results: 
A[:] And so there won’t be any—anything left; it will burn up. The 
only thing left is a burn pattern. Because the fire, itself, leaves the 
evidence of what was there. Although the evidence—the liquid is 
burned, the evidence, by the fire left there, is that there was a liquid 
there. 
Q[:] Similar to a fingerprint? 
A[:] Yes, sir. 
. . . 
A[:] . . . [T]he fire leaves the burn patterns. You can’t—you can’t alter 
the burn patterns. You cannot pollute the fire scene. You can try, but 
you can’t.75 
Here, he argued that the lack of GC-MS evidence of an 
accelerant should not be interpreted as evidence of its absence. 
Vasquez stressed that burn patterns disclose what GC-MS 
                                                          
 72. Id. at 255. 
 73. Report of Dr. Gerald Hurst, supra note 61, at 4; ARSON REVIEW 
COMM., supra note 58, at 11–12.  
 74. Gas chromatography-mass spectrometry (GC-MS) is a laboratory 
method that is used to identify and test the presence of different substances 
within a given sample. For an overview, see M. H. Mach, Gas 
Chromatography-Mass Spectrometry of Simulated Arson Residue Using 
Gasoline as an Accelerant, 22 J. FORENSIC SCI. 348, 354–56 (1977). 
 75. Statement of Facts Volume XII at 50–52, Texas v. Willingham, No. 
24,467 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Aug. 21, 1992). 
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testing could not necessarily detect due to the fire’s 
consumption of the accelerant.76 He likened burn patterns to 
fingerprints, which implied a fixed, unique, and unchangeable 
property that created a persuasive and powerful argument for 
arson. The danger in these statements is that they bolster the 
importance of arson indicators and diminish the need or 
significance of GC-MS testing. GC-MS testing can also be 
persuasive evidence that a fire started due to natural or 
accidental causes, especially if analysts, who are unaware of 
the investigative facts of the case, conduct the testing. Despite 
its utility, GC-MS testing is not always required in an 
investigation, and when performed, it is not always reported; 
rather, fire investigators may draw conclusions solely on the 
basis of their observations without chemical testing.77 
V. INVESTIGATIVE FACTS AND SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS 
A. EXTRA-LEGAL FACTORS 
Unlike other forensic disciplines, fire investigators conduct 
the investigation and collect and evaluate burn patterns and 
debris alongside reports by the police, fire fighters, other fire 
investigators, and medical professionals; they conduct 
interviews with eyewitnesses, victims, and the defendant who 
may disclose information on a potential motive for arson (e.g., 
bankruptcy evasion, revenge, vandalism).78 These extra-legal 
factors or investigative facts may be incorporated into the 
investigators’ fire scene analysis and his determination of 
arson. For example, Vasquez reviewed Fogg’s investigation 
report prior to commencing his examination and based his 
conclusion in part on external factors independent from his 
inspection of the physical evidence: 
Q[:] Based on your experience, your training, your investigation, 
examination of the scene, do you have an opinion as to whether this 
particular fire was arson or [incendiary] in nature? 
. . . 
 
                                                          
 76. Id. 
 77. See DEHAAN & ICOVE, supra note 13, at 566, 573; see also NFPA 921, 
supra note 12, at 218–23 (outlining the methods that a fire investigator would 
use to document evidence). 
 78. See ROBERT E. CARTER, ARSON INVESTIGATION 209–33 (1978); 
DEHAAN & ICOVE, supra note 13, at 254–55, 316–21; HARVEY M. FRENCH, THE 
ANATOMY OF ARSON 45–50, 59 (1979); JOHN J. O’CONNOR, PRACTICAL FIRE 
AND ARSON INVESTIGATION 257–69 (1987).  
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A[:] It’s a set fire. It’s an incen[dia]ry fire, and consequently is a crime 
of arson. 
Q[:] What led you to believe this fire was incen[dia]ry? 
A[:] Besides what I’ve already said [about an investigation of the fire 
debris], I’ve talked to the occupant of the house, and I let him talk 
and he told me a story of pure fabrication. 
[The Defense raised an objection on the basis that the conclusions are 
hearsay. The Court overrules the Defense’s objection.] 
. . . 
Q[:] Deputy Vasquez, on your investigation and examination of this, 
did you interview witnesses, including the occupants of this house? 
A[:] Yes, sir. 
Q[:] Why? 
A[:] If I am going to have a complete investigation, I have to have all 
the information I can possibly get. 
. . . 
Q[:] . . . You investigated the scene, examined the fire scene. Based on 
your experience and training and interviews that you conducted of, 
say, witnesses and the occupants of the house, do you have an opinion 
as to whether it’s incen[dia]ry or arson? 
A[:] Yes, sir. 
Q[:] And how did you arrive at that decision? 
A[:] From what I have already reiterated and explained on the 
diagram and on the photographs and the interview with the 
defendant. 
. . . 
[Defense raises objections on the basis of hearsay. Court overrules 
objection.] 
A[:] I listened to him. I never questioned him. I never asked him any 
questions. He just talked and he talked, and all he did was lie.79 
Here, Vasquez argued that he required as much information as 
possible about the offender and the events surrounding the fire, 
in order to conduct the investigation. The argument is that by 
collecting as much of the factual context of a case as possible, 
the fire investigator or forensic analyst avoids performing 
redundant or harmful tests, and this arguably allows them to 
give more accurate judgments consistent with what actually 
happened in the crime.80 This is problematic, since information 
                                                          
 79. Statement of Facts Volume XI, supra note 63, at 258–60. 
 80. For a discussion, see the section, “The Role of Forensic Scientists in 
Criminal Investigations” in William C. Thompson, What Role Should 
Investigative Facts Play in the Evaluation of Scientific Evidence? 4–8 (Univ. of 
Irvine Sch. of Law, Paper No. 2010-25, 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1694722. 
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gathered over the course of the investigation can be subjective 
and may incorporate the investigator’s theories on the events or 
motives of the fire, as would be the case in a police 
investigation.81 These investigative facts are not necessarily 
disclosed to juries. If left unquestioned during direct- or cross-
examination, juries may mistakenly interpret fire investigation 
as a scientific expertise, as it is purported, without the 
awareness that it has incorporated subjective and non-scientific 
information into its conclusions. 
B. CONTEXTUAL BIAS 
In a similar vein, another drawback of conducting the 
investigation and knowing the extra-legal information, such as 
beliefs about the suspect’s guilt, is that forensic examiners may 
be unknowingly influenced by this information, with an impact 
on their opinions and testimony.82 For example, Vasquez’s 
interview with Willingham and his evaluation of the 
eyewitness testimony may have biased his examination of the 
fire debris, burn patterns, and interpretation of the GC-MS 
testing results. By ruling out natural or accidental causes of 
the fire, the fire investigator is vulnerable to contextual bias 
that may impact which ones he eliminates. In all likelihood, 
there may be many alternative theories of the fire that cannot 
or may not be pursued in the investigation.83 This is 
particularly problematic, since contextual bias occurs on a 
subconscious level and cannot be controlled by willpower.84 
                                                          
 81. Whether a fire investigator has police powers during an investigation 
varies by state. See NFPA 921, supra note 12, at 138–39; see also INT’L ASS’N 
OF FIRE CHIEFS & NAT’L FIRE PROT. ASS’N, FUNDAMENTALS OF FIRE FIGHTER 
SKILLS 963 (2004). 
 82. For an extensive discussion of contextual bias in forensic expert 
evidence, see generally D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho 
Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of 
Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2002); Glen Whitman & 
Roger Koppl, Rational Bias in Forensic Science, 9 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 69, 
70–71 (2010); Dror & Charlton, supra note 54, at 612. 
 83. For example, in severe fires, much of the evidence may be consumed, 
damaged, or missing. For a discussion of the limitations of applying negative 
corpus in fire investigation, see DENNIS W. SMITH, THE PITFALLS, PERILS AND 
REASONING FALLACIES OF DETERMINING THE FIRE CAUSE IN THE ABSENCE OF 
PROOF: THE NEGATIVE CORPUS METHODOLOGY 4–11 (2006), available at 
http://www.tedfordpond.com/wp-content/uploads/article_1181567640.pdf. 
 84. See Thompson,  supra note 80, at 10. 
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C. OVERREACHING CLAIMS 
Another danger that is not unique to fire expertise is when 
forensic experts make “overclaims” as Professors Cole and 
Risinger suggest, drawing conclusions beyond the data and the 
methodology or exaggerating the probative value of the 
evidence.85 For example, Vasquez testified as to the intention to 
set the fire based on the burn patterns: 
A[:] . . . These pour pattern[s] indicate to me, sir, the intent of why the 
fire was set. And the intent was to prevent people from coming in 
through that place or delay this entrance of persons thereby creating 
a fire that would impede the entrance, a barrier, a fire barrier.86 
. . . 
Q[:] Based upon your investigation and your examination of the scene 
and your conclusions, can you tell what the arsonist intended to do by 
setting this fire? 
A[:] Yes. 
Q[:] What is that? 
A[:] The intent was to kill the little girls.87 
Here, Vasquez overreached his expertise and the extent of fire 
investigation techniques by interpreting the fire patterns as an 
indication of an individual’s intent to set the fire, with the 
assumption that the fire was arson and not accidental. This 
type of expert testimony can have a profound effect on the 
weight the jury places on the evidence, which can ultimately 
impact the final verdict. NAS highlighted the need to clarify 
and standardize the reporting of forensic evidence at trial, 
suggesting that experts state their conclusions in such a way 
that they reflect the limitations of the evidence;88 however, the 
validity of the techniques or how experts draw conclusions from 
their investigative methods remains far from transparent. 
According to the Federal Rules of Evidence section 702, 
expert witnesses are given a certain degree of latitude and are 
permitted to state their opinions based on their experience and 
knowledge beyond the scope of jury members.89 In the case of 
                                                          
 85. See Simon A. Cole, Where the Rubber Meets the Road: Thinking about 
Expert Evidence as Expert Testimony, 52 VILL. L. REV. 803, 817–38 (2007); 
Risinger, Defining, supra note 5, at 787–89. 
 86. Statement of Facts Volume XI, supra note 63, at 250–51. 
 87. Statement of Facts Volume XII, supra note 75, at 54. 
 88. The use of standardized terminology to describe the results of forensic 
testing is not common practice in the forensic sciences. See A PATH FORWARD, 
supra note 1, at 21. 
 89. FED. R. EVID. 702 (Committee Notes on Rules—2000 Amendment). 
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fire expertise, this has included opinions on the ultimate issue 
of the defendant’s guilt or innocence, which should be the 
exclusive domain of the judge or jury. Vasquez testified that the 
fire was intentionally set and openly discredited Willingham’s 
account of the events. Despite the defense’s objections, the 
court permited Vasquez to name Willingham as the person who 
set the fire: 
Q[:] Based upon all your investigation and interviews and experience 
as a fire or arson investigator, do you have an opinion as to the person 
or persons who started this particular fire? 
. . . 
A[:] Yes, sir. 
Q[:] What is that opinion? 
A[:] The occupant, Mr. Willingham.90 
Vasquez was admitted as an expert witness to testify as to the 
cause and origin of the fire, yet the court gave him latitude to 
opine that the defendant intended to commit arson, that the 
fire was incendiary, and that the defendant was guilty. This 
testimony had the potential to contaminate the ultimate issue 
of the case that should have been left to the purview of the jury 
or judge. In this way, the fire expert became the final decision 
maker, and his position was further bolstered by the fact that 
he had access to all evidence in the case. The danger of this 
type of testimony lies in that its probative value is exaggerated, 
since the judge and jury may erroneously perceive the fire 
investigator as providing independent evidence from witness 
statements, rather than recognize that this extra-legal 
information was incorporated into the expert’s initial 
investigation. In other words, the value of Vasquez’s expert 
testimony as evidence was dependent on the accuracy of the 
witness statements. In effect, the judge and jury unknowingly 
double counted the weight of the witness evidence in making 
their decisions.91 
                                                          
 90. Statement of Facts Volume XI, supra note 63, at 267–68. 
 91. For a discussion of “double counting” evidence, see Thompson, supra 
note 80, at 17. 
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VI. POST-CONVICTION INEFFICIENCIES TO  
DETECT AND CORRECT ERRORS 
A. FAILED APPEALS, HABEAS CORPUS, PETITION, AND CLEMENCY 
PETITION 
Appellate courts and habeas petitions are the legal 
safeguards that are in place to identify and remedy such 
incidents where outdated methods or misleading expert 
testimony are presented at trial. In Willingham’s case, issues 
with the validity of the fire evidence were not raised on appeal 
or in the habeas petition. One month after a jury trial convicted 
Willingham and sentenced him to death in 1992, the NFPA 
published its guidelines, which questioned the validity and 
reliability of arson indicators. Despite this, Willingham’s nine 
appeals of his conviction before the Texas State Court of 
Appeals did not raise the issue of the validity of the fire expert 
testimony.92 
In 2001, nine years after the publication of the NFPA 921, 
the U.S. District Court denied Willingham’s habeas corpus 
petition.93 Again, the petition failed to raise issue with the 
contested investigation techniques employed by the fire 
experts. Rather, it highlighted the appellate counsel’s 
inefficiency to raise issue with Vasquez’s testimony on the 
veracity of Willingham’s account within the scope of his expert 
opinion, which the habeas court found permissible and affirmed 
the trial court’s ruling.94 
Vasquez also testified as to the ultimate fact of the case of 
whether Willingham set the fire; however, the habeas court 
deemed the error as harmless and argued that it had no effect 
on the jury’s guilty verdict, although overstepping the purview 
of the jury.95 The court described Vasquez and Fogg’s 
testimonies as “uncontroverted expert testimony . . . that an 
accelerant was used to start the fire intentionally”96 and cited 
extrinsic factors related to Willingham’s perceived 
                                                          
 92. See Willingham v. State, 897 S.W.2d 351 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); Ex 
Parte Willingham, No. 35,162-02 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Ex Parte Willingham, 
No. 35,162 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). 
 93. Willingham v. Johnson, No. Civ. A. 3:98-CV-0409-L, 2001 WL 
1677023, at *25 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 31, 2001). 
 94. Id. at *16–18. 
 95. Id. at *18. 
 96. Id. 
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inappropriate behavior as a grieving parent as circumstantial 
evidence: his “lack of concern or grief in the hospital after the 
fire,” his reported “carefree attitude one day after the fire,” and 
the fact that he asked investigators to help him locate his 
dartboard among the fire debris.97 The court raised other 
evidence that supported the conviction and excused Vasquez’s 
testimony on the ultimate issue of guilt in the case. This is 
permissible, since the determination of harmless error is highly 
discretionary and flexible in that it allows the court to review 
all evidence placed before the jury while assuming the guilt of 
the defendant.98 That is, rather than have the court determine 
whether the contested testimony contributed to the jury’s 
actual guilty verdict, it determines whether there is sufficient 
supporting evidence to excuse the guilty finding.99 In this 
respect, harmless error undermines the very safeguards in 
place to protect the innocent from detection and the correction 
of miscarriages of justice that may have occurred at trial due to 
faulty or misleading evidence.100 
After Willingham exhausted all steps in the legal process 
to seek exoneration, he sought a petition for clemency to the 
Governor of Texas as a last resort.101 Granting clemency is an 
act of mercy that is at the discretion of one individual and it is 
meant as a failsafe to catch any errors in the justice system in 
which an innocent person may be executed.102 As a basis for the 
clemency petition, Pat Cox, one of Willingham’s cousins, 
enlisted Gerald Hurst, a recognized expert in fires and 
explosives, to review the evidence presented at trial.103 He filed 
a report that identified “critical errors” with Fogg and 
Vasquez’s conclusions that the fire was incendiary.104 He 
                                                          
 97. Id. 
 98. For a detailed discussion of harmless error in cases of innocence, see 
Brandon L. Garrett, Innocence, Harmless Error, and Federal Wrongful 
Conviction Law, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 35, 57–63. 
 99. Id. at 57. 
 100. For a discussion on the use of habeas corpus petitions in trials that 
involved discredited evidence, such as the case with arson evidence, see Wolf, 
supra note 20, at 235–37. 
 101. Rachel Farris, Dare Devils: Governor Rick Perry and the Texas Death 
Panel, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 12, 2009, 07:33 PM), http://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/rachel-farris/dare-devils-governor-rick_b_284698.html. 
 102. See Austin Sarat, Mercy, Clemency, and Capital Punishment: Two 
Accounts, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 273, 274–76 (2005). 
 103. See Mills & Possley, supra note 60. 
 104. See Report of Dr. Gerald Hurst, supra note 61, at 4–6. 
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emphasized that after Willingham’s trial, advances in 
technology led the field of fire and arson investigators to 
question and contest each of the twenty arson indicators Fogg 
and Vasquez identified in the fire.105 He cited the NFPA 921 as 
a “landmark publication” that had become the “de facto 
standard of care for the fire investigation community.”106 The 
clemency petition requested a stay of execution and a ninety-
day reprieve based on new evidence to allow Hurst to conduct a 
full investigation.107 After exhausting all legal avenues for 
recourse, Governor Rick Perry and the Texas Board of Pardons 
and Paroles denied the petition.108 Cameron Todd Willingham 
was executed after having served twelve years in prison on 
February 17, 2004.109 
B. FORENSIC SCIENCE COMMISSION INVESTIGATION 
State-based forensic science and innocence commissions 
may re-investigate cases outside of the court system, which 
marks another means by which flawed evidence may be 
detected and corrected post-conviction. In 2008, the Texas 
Forensic Science Commission (TFSC) agreed to investigate the 
fire evidence in Willingham’s case.110 While they would not rule 
on actual innocence, the TFSC’s mandate is to investigate 
complaints of negligence or misconduct in criminal cases that 
involved forensic evidence, which could directly affect the 
practice and future of fire expertise.111 
In carrying out its investigation into Willingham’s case, the 
TFSC sought an independent review from Craig Beyler, an 
experienced fire and explosives investigation expert, to 
examine the fire investigation evidence in relation to the 
existing standards of procedures at the time of the 
                                                          
 105. Id. at 2. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See Letter from Maria Ramirez, Clemency Adm’r, to Walter Reaves, 
Jr. (Feb. 13, 2004), available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/ 
Willingham_foia.pdf. 
 108. See Mills & Possley, supra note 60. 
 109. See id. 
 110. See The Texas Forensic Science Commission and the Willingham Case, 
INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/The_Texas_ 
Forensic_Science_Commission_and_the_Willingham_Case.php (last visited 
Mar. 2, 2013). 
 111. See About Us, TEX. FORENSIC SCI. COMMISSION, http://www.fsc.state. 
tx.us/about/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2013). 
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investigation as well as the current standards.112 Beyler offered 
several alternative explanations to the cause of the fire that 
Fogg and Vasquez did not eliminate in their investigations, 
such as an electrical fire caused by the appliances or the ceiling 
fans or the possibility that Willingham’s eldest daughter 
accidentally set the fire with a cigarette lighter.113 He 
concluded that neither Fogg nor Vasquez’s investigations, nor 
their testimonies, were compliant with existing standards of 
care at the time and do not comply with the existing standards 
as outlined in the NFPA 921.114 
This point became moot in 2011, when the Attorney 
General, Greg Abbott, declared that the TFSC did not have 
jurisdiction to consider evidence in the Willingham case and 
could not pass a ruling on negligence or misconduct.115 By 
narrowly defining the TFSC’s jurisdiction as only applying to 
cases heard after its establishment in 2005, it effectively 
stopped the investigation indefinitely and restricted the TFSC’s 
power to hold the fire investigators in Willingham’s case 
accountable for their actions or to enforce changes in the field 
to validate its methods and improve its practices. 
VII. FIRE AND ARSON INVESTIGATION COMMUNITY 
Prior to the Attorney General’s dismissal of the TFSC’s 
investigation of the Willingham case on the grounds of 
jurisdiction, the TFSC solicited responses to Beyler’s report 
from the SFMO and the Corsicana Fire Department that 
carried out Willingham’s investigation.116 Their correspondence 
highlighted the contentious nature of the field of fire and arson 
investigation where opinions based on experience, rather than 
science, are still highly valued and deemed part of acceptable 
practice within the community.117 This is, in part, due to the 
fact that fire investigation practices openly endorse the use of 
                                                          
 112. See The Texas Forensic Science Commission and the Willingham Case, 
supra note 110. 
 113. BEYLER, supra note 58, at 45–46. 
 114. Id. at 51. 
 115. See Letter from Greg Abbott, Attorney Gen. of Tex., to Nizam 
Peerwani, Presiding Officer, Tex. Forensic Sci. Comm’n (July 29, 2011), 
available at https://www.oag.state.tx.us/opinions/opinions/50abbott/op/2011/ 
htm/ga-0866.htm. 
 116. See Letter from Leigh Tomlin, Comm’n Coordinator, Tex. Forensic Sci. 
Comm’n, to State Fire Marshal’s Office (Aug. 2, 2010) (on file with author). 
 117. See id. 
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witness interrogation and the analysis of human behavior 
along with investigating aspects of the fire.118 Subjective 
interpretation of fire patterns is required in fire investigation119 
and discretion allows investigators to select from a myriad of 
extra-legal aspects of a case or artifacts of the fire on which to 
concentrate their investigations.120 It is therefore not 
surprising that fire investigators may reach different 
conclusions about the same fire. In fact, reaching different 
conclusions based on “expertise” is an accepted outcome among 
fire investigators due to these varied investigative practices.121 
While it might be expected that fire investigators agree with 
Beyler’s analysis of the fire evidence in light of new research 
and support by other fire experts,122 the subjective nature of 
the profession allows for contradicting opinions. 
The Corsicana Fire Chief issued a twenty-one page 
rebuttal to Beyler’s report based on the trial transcripts, police 
reports, and media accounts of the case, but without access to 
the tapes, photographs, fire investigation reports, or any of the 
physical evidence available to Beyler on which he could base 
his conclusions.123 The rebuttal defended Fogg and Vasquez’s 
testimony as valid and reliable based on a close reading of the 
witness testimonies at trial.124 He acknowledged that arson 
indicators are not necessarily indicative of arson, but argued 
that since there are cases where accelerants are used that 
produced similar burn patterns,125 Fogg and Vasquez’s reliance 
on arson indicators was justifiable.126 
The Corsicana Fire Chief stated, “[I]f [the fire] isn’t 
accidental, it is intentional”;127 through the process of 
elimination of natural and accidental causes of a fire, one can 
                                                          
 118. See Letter from Paul Maldonado, Tex. State Fire Marshall, to Tex. 
Forensic Sci. Comm’n (Aug. 20, 2010) (on file with author). 
 119. See Brannigan & Torero, supra note 57 (discussing the subjective 
nature of fire investigation). 
 120. See supra Part V.A (discussing the extra-legal aspects of fire 
investigation at length). 
 121. Brannigan & Torero, supra note 57. 
 122. See, e.g., ARSON REVIEW COMM., supra note 58, at 11–12. 
 123. Letter from Donald McMullan, Corsicana, Tex. Fire Chief, to Tex. 
Forensic Sci. Comm’n (Sept. 29, 2009) (on file with author). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
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draw the conclusion of arson. Many fire investigators believe 
they are permitted to use the process of elimination, or negative 
corpus, to rule out all known possible causes of the fire, if they 
suspect arson.128 However, how to eliminate accidental causes 
in a systematic way and whether it is possible to eliminate all 
natural causes to draw a conclusion of arson is a contentious 
issue within the fire community.129 Such an approach is 
dependent on the fire investigator’s skill at ruling out any and 
all possible non-incendiary causes of fire that could have 
existed at the time.130 This is not typically discussed and is left 
to the discretion of the investigator, as the Corsicana Fire Chief 
pointed out, “[W]hat constitutes ‘elimination’ is, to some degree, 
a matter of the investigator’s judgment, which I believe should 
be based on reasonable scientific principles.”131 
The Fire Chief defended the overreaching claims fire 
experts testify to in court, such as Vasquez’s testimony that “a 
fire does not lie” and the “fire tells a story,” as a “colloquial way 
of expressing what physical facts can tell an experienced 
investigator about what happened during a particular fire.”132 
Again, the investigator’s experience trumps scientific tests that 
may disprove arson, such as the negative chemical tests of 
accelerants in the debris. The investigator is given the benefit 
of the doubt that he used logical and even scientific 
assessments in making the determination of arson by virtue of 
his position and expertise.133 
The TFSC also requested an opinion from the SFMO, who 
stated that they supported Fogg and Vasquez’s reports and 
conclusions in the case.134 They disputed Beyler’s evaluation of 
the evidence and expert testimony and stated that the fire 
investigators in Willingham’s case used “principles that can be 
                                                          
 128. LENTINI, supra note 13, at 127–29.  
 129. See generally DEHAAN & ICOVE, supra note 13, at 322 (“While some 
investigators treat negative corpus as a ‘catchall,’ it is a very difficult case to 
prove and should be relied upon only in the most special circumstances. 
Negative corpus cases are accepted in some jurisidictions and not in 
others . . . .”). 
 130. Id. (discussing the complexity of  collecting enough data to exclude all 
other hypothesis except arson). 
 131. Letter from Donald McMullan, supra note 123. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See Brannigan & Torero, supra note 57 (arguing that fire 
investigation lacks a scientific process).  
 134. Letter from Paul Maldonado, supra note 118. 
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linked to NFPA 921 standards subsequently put in place”135 
and highlighted the fact that the NFPA 921 does not prohibit or 
preclude the use of arson indicators to determine an incendiary 
fire, rather, they indicate that this same physical evidence may 
be present in arson.136 Part of the difficulty with applying the 
NFPA 921 guidelines is that they are not standards or 
requirements for fire investigation and they are written with 
indeterminate language regarding the use of arson 
indicators.137 Additionally, fire investigation routinely relies on 
extra-legal factors and the analysis of second-hand or third-
party information,138 which makes it that much more difficult 
to discern or predict conclusions by individual investigators. 
VIII. FUTURE OF FIRE AND ARSON EXPERTISE 
Incorporating investigative facts into scientific analysis, 
contextual bias, overreaching claims, and testifying to the 
ultimate issue of a case are serious problems that the legal 
system and forensic science community must contend with 
regarding the use of fire investigation expertise. Despite 
empirical evidence that discredits existing investigation 
methodologies and techniques, members of the fire community 
remain resistant to acknowledge or correct such errors, or 
adopt national standards and protocols.139 
Professor William Thompson suggested the division of 
labor and the creation of case managers to liaise between police 
investigators and forensic analysts in order to control for 
contextual bias: 
[The ‘case manager model’] seeks to minimize both contextual 
ignorance and contextual bias through a separation of functions. 
Forensic scientists serve either as case managers or analysts. The role 
of case manager is to communicate with police officers and detectives, 
participate in decisions about what specimens to collect at crime 
scenes and how to test those specimens, and manage the flow of work 
to the laboratory. The role of the analyst is to perform analytic tests 
and comparisons on specimens submitted to the laboratory in 
accordance with the instructions of case managers. 
                                                          
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. See Brannigan & Torero, supra note 57.  
 138. See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text. 
 139. See generally Thompson, supra note 80, at 3 (detailing the tension 
that exists as the increasing use of forensic evidence meets the scientific 
demand for empirical evidence). 
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 This separation of function allows case managers to be fully 
informed of the investigative context . . . while [the] analyst remain[s] 
blind to the context and [is] thereby protected from contextual 
bias . . . .140 
This model may be incorporated in fire investigation 
techniques by making the investigator the case manager and 
requiring independent analysts to perform blind and 
mandatory GC-MS testing of samples without receiving any 
information about the specimens or the case. Under this model, 
physical evidence would be collected and documented 
meticulously, and analysts would be made aware of what 
samples to collect and what actions might lead to 
contamination.141 This would allow for the separation of the 
laboratory analysis from contextual information about the case 
gained during the investigation. 
While the proposed model may control or limit contextual 
bias, it does not address the issue that arson experts 
incorporate investigative facts into their scientific conclusions. 
Incorporating extra-legal factors, such as interviews with 
witnesses and victims or reading medical reports and police 
reports, are routinely relied upon and endorsed in fire 
investigations.142 However, it is difficult to justify this practice 
when presented as scientific expertise in court.143 Rather, fire 
experts could refrain from gathering extra-legal or contextual 
case information and determine the cause and origin of the fire 
and whether it was arson based solely on the analysis of the 
physical evidence and its chemical testing. There are few other 
forensic disciplines that endorse such a practice or have access 
to this type of information as fire investigators.144 Removing all 
extra-legal information and basing conclusions solely on the 
physical evidence and chemical testing could eliminate such a 
problem. 
The NAS report suggested that forensic scientists create a 
uniform terminology across the disciplines to describe findings 
                                                          
 140. Id. at 6. 
 141. See id.; see also Simon A. Cole, Acculturating Forensic Science: What is 
‘Scientific Culture’, and How Can Forensic Science Adopt It?, 38 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 435, 454–57 (2010). 
 142. See supra Part V.A (discussing the extra-legal aspects of fire 
investigation at length). 
 143. See Brannigan & Torero, supra note 57. 
 144. Cf. Saks & Faigman, supra note 20, at 150–51 (criticizing the 
unscientific aspects and methods of many of the subfields of forensic science). 
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and conclusions in court.145 Such standardization would ensure 
that the statements convey conclusions about the evidence 
accurately and would eliminate overreaching claims in expert 
testimony.146 However, before this can be accomplished, more 
research is needed to validate existing fire investigation 
methodology, such as eliminating natural and accidental 
causes to determine arson, and this research should be carried 
out with the utmost scrutiny by scientifically trained 
researchers.147 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The Willingham case may be the first case in which a 
government body acknowledges the wrongful execution of an 
innocent person in the United States.148 According to legal 
scholars, some forensic scientists, and media outlets, the fire 
evidence played a key role in Willingham’s execution.149 The 
discussion of fire evidence serves as an apt illustration of the 
paradigm shift in professional knowledge in the forensic 
sciences from experience-based to scientifically informed 
expertise in light of changing legal requirements of expert 
evidence. The analysis of the origins of fire expertise and the 
expert testimony in Willingham’s case highlights the dangers 
courts face in accepting such evidence without scrutiny.150 
Specifically, fire experts present scientific conclusions that 
incorporate investigative facts; they may make overreaching 
claims that are unsupported by empirical evidence; they are 
subject to contextual bias due to a reliance on extra-legal 
information during their investigations; and courts have 
                                                          
 145. See A PATH FORWARD, supra note 1, at 14–23, 109–10. 
 146. See id. 
 147. See, e.g., Cooley & Oberfield, supra note 60, at 286; see also Jennifer L. 
Mnookin et al., The Need for a Research Culture in the Forensic Sciences, 58 
UCLA L. REV. 725, 744–53 (2011); Cole, supra note 141, at 463–70. 
 148. Grann, supra note 62. 
 149. See, e.g., Craig M. Cooley, Nurturing Forensic Science: How 
Appropriate Funding and Government Oversight Can Further Strengthen the 
Forensic Community, 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 441, 442–43 (2011); 
Giannelli, supra note 60, at 3–8; Grann, supra note 62; Mills & Possley, supra 
note 60; Meghan J. Ryan, Remedying Wrongful Execution, 45 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 261, 307 (2012); Roger Koppl, The Social Construction of Expertise, 47 
SOCIETY 220, 223 (2010); see also Cooley & Oberfield, supra note 60, at 331–
32. 
 150. See Cooley, supra note 149, at 442–43. 
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permitted them to testify to the ultimate issue of the case: the 
defendant’s guilt. While the fire investigation profession has 
transitioned over the past twenty years with advancements in 
research, legal safeguards such as appeals, and habeas corpus 
and clemency petitions are ill equipped to detect such changes. 
External oversight bodies, including forensic science 
commissions, may not have jurisdiction to revisit innocence or 
enforce new standards, guidelines, or empirical research 
testing, and the forensic disciplines may be averse to taking 
responsibility and managing the consequences of having used 
outdated or discredited evidence in their investigations. 
Advancements in DNA testing technology have brought to 
light a wave of wrongful convictions over the past few decades; 
with a push for more research and the empirical testing of 
forensic science techniques and claims, the criminal justice 
system and forensic science community may soon be faced with 
an influx of claims of innocence based on disproven evidence in 
other forensic disciplines. Unlike miscarriages of justice caused 
by serology or hair analyses whose samples can be retested 
using forensic DNA techniques to compare genetic information 
and provide conclusive evidence of innocence, in arson cases, 
proof of innocence cannot necessarily be established regardless 
of advancements in research and technology. The very 
determination that a fire is arson requires that there is 
evidence that it was intentionally set; while the presence of 
chemical accelerants could be interpreted as such evidence, 
there is no way to irrefutably prove intent. For example, 
common household items and floorboards may contain the 
same chemical trace elements as those found in accelerants 
that could be interpreted by investigators as indicative of arson 
if found at a fire site.151 Or chemical accelerants may be present 
in accidental or naturally caused fires and misinterpreted as 
indicators of arson. For example, a fire in a hardware store that 
stocks paints, varnishes and other highly flammable materials 
that could produce the same chemical results or burn patterns 
as an incendiary fire using similar accelerants. In both 
instances, there would be little evidence in which arson or 
innocence could be irrefutably proven to the same degree of 
certainty as forensic DNA testing. The problem therein lies 
with the inability to prove innocence in combination with a 
                                                          
 151.  John Lentini, Persistence of Floor Coating Solvents, 46 J. FORENSIC 
SCI. 1470, 1470–73 (2001). 
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forensic culture that lacks scientific rigor and validation of its 
investigative techniques and exhibits resistance to such 
advancements, with a judicial and penal culture that permits 
such evidence in criminal cases with little contention or 
effective safeguards to correct for errors. 
If we consider the number of potentially innocent 
individuals that may be affected by outdated fire expertise, it is 
staggeringly high. According to the U.S. Fire Administration, 
between 1999 and 2008, there were an estimated 1.6 million 
fires annually, resulting in an average of 22,000 injuries and 
deaths each year, and totaling an estimated $11.6 million in 
property loss and damage yearly.152 While only 0.3% of those 
annual fires (43,000) are classified as having been intentionally 
set,153 there still remains the potential that thousands of 
arrests and convictions each year may have relied on 
overreaching testimony or evidence collected and interpreted 
using a defunct methodology. 
 
                                                          
 152. Fire Statistics, U.S. FIRE ADMIN., www.usfa.dhs.gov/statistics/ 
national/index.shtm (last updated Jan. 22, 2013). 
 153. Id. 
